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Non-technical summary
We propose a novel empirical framework to assess financial system risk. Using recent statistical techniques we infer common factors underlying macro-financial and credit risk conditions from a large data set comprising the U.S., the E.U. area, and the respective rest of the world. The extracted risk factors are then combined into coincident risk measures and early warning indicators for financial distress.
Coincident risk measures are referred to as 'thermometers'. As an analogy, such indicators can be plugged into the financial system to read off its 'heat'. For example, we estimate a broad financial sector failure rate that takes into account a large cross section of banks and financial non-banks. This failure rate represents the share of currently active financial firms which, at current levels of stress, can be expected to fail over the next three months. We further estimate the probability of simultaneous failure of a large number of financial sector firms. For example, we may be interested in the time-varying probability that 1% or more of the currently active financial firms fail over a one year horizon.
A high cross-sectional dimension poses computational challenges to various measures for financial stability, see for example Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) . Using a dynamic factor structure, we effectively overcome these problems and capture the dynamics of approximately 400 European and 450 U.S. financial firms, and many more non-financial firms by combining actual failure counts, macroeconomic data, and expected default frequencies for inference on financial risk conditions.
Our proposed early warning indicator for financial distress is based on current deviations of credit risk conditions from their underlying macro-financial fundamentals. In an empirical study of international credit and macro data, we find that credit risk conditions can significantly and persistently de-couple from fundamentals due to e.g. unobserved changes in credit supply and the ease of credit access. We demonstrate that such decoupling has preceded financial and macroeconomic distress in the past. As a result, such decoupling can serve as an early warning signal for financial stability policies.
Introduction
Macro-prudential oversight seeks to focus on safeguarding the financial system as a whole.
This has proven to be a major issue in the wake of the recent financial crisis. The debate on macro-prudential policies and potential warning signals ignited by the crisis is currently under full swing. Many of the models constructed before the crisis have fallen short in this respect. For example, regulators have learned the hard way that cross-sectional correlations between asset and credit exposures can have severe consequences, even though each of these exposures might be qualified as safe when considered in isolation. Cross-sectional dependence undermines the benefits of diversification and may lead to a 'fallacy of composition' at the systemic level, see for example Brunnermeier, Crocket, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin (2009) .
In particular, traditional risk-based capital regulation at the individual institution level may significantly underestimate systemic risk by neglecting the macro impact of a joint reaction of financial intermediaries to a common shock.
There is widespread agreement that financial systemic risk is characterized by both crosssectional and time-related dimensions; see, for example, Hartmann, de Bandt, and Alcalde (2009) . The cross-sectional dimension concerns how risks are correlated across financial institutions at a given point in time due to, for example, direct and indirect linkages across institutions and prevailing default conditions. The time series dimension concerns the evolution of systemic risk over time due to, for example, changes in the default cycle, changes in financial market conditions, and the potential buildup of financial imbalances such as asset and credit market bubbles.
In contrast to the broad consensus on the set of models, indicators, and analytical tools for macroeconomic and monetary policy analysis, such agreement is absent for macro-prudential policy analysis. The current paper makes a step in filling this gap. In particular, we make two contributions to the existing literature on systemic risk assessment.
First, we propose a unified econometric framework for the measurement of global macrofinancial and credit risk conditions based on state space methods. The framework follows the mixed-measurement dynamic factor model (MM-DFM) approach as introduced by Koop-
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April 2011 man, Lucas, and Schwaab (2010) . Our model provides a diagnostic tool that tracks the evolution of macro-financial developments and point in time risk conditions, as well as their joint impact on system stability. Such a diagnostic tool for systemic risk measurement is definitely needed as a first step to start assessing and communicating this risk. Second, we develop a set of coincident and forward looking indicators for financial distress based on the empirical output of our analysis. We distinguish 'thermometers' and a 'crystal ball'. Thermometers are coincident risk indicators that, metaphorically, a policy maker can plug into the financial system to read off its 'heat'. A crystal ball is a forward looking early warning indicator that -to some extent -permits a glimpse into the future of financial stability conditions. Early warning indicators may be based on estimated deviations from fundamentals that accrue in the present. Obviously, constructing a useful early warning signal is substantially harder than an assessment of current risk conditions.
We use our framework to study systemic risk conditions across three broad geographical regions, i.e., (i) the U.S., (ii) current EU-27 countries, and (iii) all remaining countries. In this way, our perspective departs substantially from most earlier studies that typically focus on one region only, in particular the U.S. Several people have stressed the importance of such an international perspective, see e.g. de Larosiere (2009), and Brunnermeier et al. (2009) .
It requires one to look beyond domestic developments for detecting financial stability risk.
In the context of the recent crisis. For example, the saving behavior of Asian countries has been cited as a contributing factor to low interest rates and easy credit access in the U.S., see e.g. Brunnermeier (2009) . Similarly, developments in the U.S. housing market have triggered distress for European financial institutions. In our MM-DFM model, we allow for the differential impact of world business cycle conditions on regional default rates, unobserved regional risk factors, as well as world-wide industry sector dynamics.
Our empirical study is based on worldwide credit data for more than 12.000 firms. We differentiate between the impact of macro and financial market conditions on defaults versus autonomous default dynamics, and industry effects. We refer to the autonomous default dynamics as frailty effects, see also Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2009 conditions are much too benign compared to observed macro and financial data. In either case, a macro-prudential policy maker should be aware of a possible decoupling of systematic default risk conditions from their macro-financial fundamentals. The flexible tool of mixed measurement dynamic factor models provides the necessary sophisticated and flexible measurement tool needed for a timely detection of this decoupling.
Our work is related to two lines of literature. First, we relate to the work on accurately measuring point-in-time credit risk conditions. In general, this is a complicated task since not all processes that determine corporate default and financial distress are easily observed.
Recent research indicates that readily available macro-financial variables and firm-level information may not be sufficient to capture the large degree of default clustering present in corporate default data, see e.g. Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) . In particular, there is substantial evidence for an additional dynamic unobserved 'frailty' risk factor as well as contagion dynamics, see McNeil and Wendin (2007) , Koopman, Lucas, and Monteiro (2008) , , Lando and Nielsen (2008) , and Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2009), and Azizpour, Giesecke, and Schwenkler (2010) . 'Frailty' and contagion risk cause default dependence above and beyond what is implied by observed covariates alone. Compared to these earlier papers, our current paper takes an explicit international perspective.
In addition, it allows for both macro, frailty, and industry effects. Finally, it provides a unified framework to integrate systemic risk signals from different sources, whether macroeconomic and financial market conditions, equity markets and balance sheet information (via expected default frequencies, EDFs), or actual defaults.
Another line of literature relates to our second contribution, the construction of systemic risk measures. Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) adopt a copula perspective to link together the failure of several financial institutions. Their approach is partly non-parametric, whereas our framework is parametric. However, our parametric framework lends itself more easily to extensions to high dimensions, i.e., a large number of individual financial institutions. This is practically impossible in the Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) approach due to the nonparametric characteristics. Extensions to higher dimensions is a relevant issue in our current study, as we take a, literally, global perspective of the financial system. Another paper related to ours is Giesecke and Kim (2010) . These authors take a hazard rate approach with contagion and observed macro-financial factors (no frailty). In contrast to their model, our mixed-measurements framework allows us to model the macro developments and default dynamics in a joint factor structure. Giesecke and Kim, by contrast, take the macro data as exogenous regressors in their analysis. Also, our study explicitly incorporates the global dimension and distinguishes between global and regional factors.
April 2011 The remainder of this paper is set up as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the literature on systemic risk measurement and discuss the desirable properties of a good systemic risk measure. Section 3 discusses our econometric framework that is based on a mixedmeasurement dynamic factor model. Some details of parameter and factor estimation are given as well. Section 4 presents the data. Sections 5 discusses the main empirical results and presents coincident and forward-looking measures of financial distress. Section 6 concludes.
Quantitative measures of systemic risk

A post-crisis literature review
We briefly review a selection of quantitative measures of systemic risk that have recently been proposed in the literature. In that literature, systemic risk is understood in two different but related ways. First, the 'systemic risk contribution' associated with a large and complex financial institution corresponds to a negative externality its risk taking has on other firms.
It is the extent to which a firm 'pollutes the public good' of financial stability. Given accurate measures of risk contribution, such an externality may be internalized e.g. through Pigouvian taxation. Conversely, however, systemic risk is often understood as financial system risk.
We follow this second convention. This notion is analogous to assessing the total size of the (risk) pie (rather than its composition). It may be operationalized as the time varying probability of experiencing a systemic event, e.g., the simultaneous failure of a large number of financial intermediaries.
The literature on financial system risk can be usefully structured by making a distinction between the different sources of systemic risk. First, financial sector contagion risk is caused by an initially idiosyncratic problem that sequentially becomes widespread in the cross-section. Second, shared exposure to financial market shocks and macroeconomic developments may cause simultaneous problems for financial intermediaries. Third, financial imbalances such as credit and asset market bubbles that build up gradually over time may unravel suddenly, with detrimental effects for the system. We review the literature based on this distinction that is also used in the ECB (2009) report and the lecture of Trichet (2009) . Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) show how each financial institution's contribution to overall systemic risk can be measured.
Systemic risk contribution:
The extent to which an institution imposes a negative externality on the system is called
Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES). An institution's SES increases in its leverage and MES,
Marginal Expected Shortfall. Brownlees and Engle (2010) propose ways to estimate the MES. Zhu (2009, 2010) Giesecke and Kim (2010) define systemic risk as the conditional (timevarying) probability of failure of a large number of financial institutions, based on a dynamic hazard rate model with macroeconomic covariates. A related study using a large number of macroeconomic and financial covariates is Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab (2011) .
Financial imbalances:
Financial imbalances such as credit and asset market bubbles may build up gradually over time. However, they may unravel quite suddenly and abruptly with detrimental effects on financial markets and intermediaries. Financial imbalances are not easily characterized and difficult to quantify. Inference on financial misalignments can be based on observed covariates, such as the private-credit-to-GDP ratio, total-lending-growth, valuation ratios, changes in property and asset prices, financial system leverage and capital adequacy, etc., see e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002) , Misina and Tkacz (2008) , and Barrell, Davis, Karim, and Liadze (2010) . Despite recent progress, these models still display large errors when predicting financial stress.
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What is needed for measuring systemic risk?
We identify five core features for an appropriate indicator of systemic risk. We refer to these features in the next sections where we discuss our econometric framework.
A broader definition of systemic risk: Current tools for financial risk measurement rely on relatively narrow definitions of a systemic event. A more comprehensive framework could be based on e.g. the theoretical work of Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2006) who argue that systemic risk arises from (i) spillover dynamics at the financial industry level,
(ii) shocks to the macroeconomic and financial markets environment, and implicitly (iii) the potential unraveling of widespread financial imbalances. These sources of risk act on observed data simultaneously, and should therefore all be part of a diagnostic framework. Otherwise, incorrect risk attributions may arise. For example, allowing for interconnectedness through business links but not for shared exposure to common risk factors may spuriously attribute dependence to links that do not exist. (EDF) which are based on structural models for credit risk. We include this measure in our empirical analysis. Other information can be added in the form of credit default swaps (CDS) spreads. However, the short length of time series of liquid CDS for individual firms is typically a problem.
International or inter-regional focus:
Unobserved factors: Financial distress, systemic risk, and the time-varying probability of a systemic event are inherently unobserved processes. Their main drivers are also unobserved: contagion risk at the financial sector level, changes in shared macro-financial conditions, and financial imbalances such as unobserved large shifts in credit supply. Many of these unobserved conditions, however, can be inferred (reverse-engineered) from different sets of observed data. The appropriate econometric tools for extracting unobserved factors from observed data are collectively known as state space methods.
3 The diagnostic framework
Mixed-measurement dynamic factor models
We use the mixed-measurement dynamic factor model (MM-DFM) approach as introduced in Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab (2010) . The approach is based on a state space framework and incorporates all desired features as stated in Section 2.2. The main idea is to estimate the composite factors of unobserved systemic risk using a panel of time series observations. Once the unobserved (or latent) risk factors are estimated, we can construct an accurate coincident and forward looking measures of systemic risk.
Credit risk is the main risk in the banking book and time-varying credit conditions are therefore central to systemic risk assessment. Our data sources for assessing credit risk consist of N macroeconomic and financial market variables x t , default counts y t obtained from historical information across R regions, and expected default frequencies (EDFs) z t for S r financial firms in the rth region for r = 1, . . . , R and for time index t = 1, . . . , T . The data is denoted by The model combines normally and non-normally distributed variables. We adopt a standard conditional independence assumption: conditional on latent factors f t , the measurements (x t , y t , z t ) are independent over time and within the cross-section. In our specific case and conditional on f t , we assume that the elements of x t are normally distributed with their means as functions of f t . The default counts y r,jt have a binomial distribution with k r,jt trials and with a probability π r,jt that is a function of f t . The number of trials k r,jt refers to the number of firms and π r,jt is the probability of default for a specific cross-section j in region r at time t. The EDFs z t are transformed to represent a frequency for a quarterly horizon. The corresponding log-odds ratio is defined asz r,st = log (z r,st /(1 − z r,st )). We effectively model the log-odds as being a normal variable (conditional on f t ). The factor structure distinguishes macro, regional frailty, and industry-specific effects, denoted by f
The latent factors are the main input for our systemic risk measures which we discuss below.
In the factor model structure we assume that the macroeconomic and financial variables in x t are only determined by the macro factors while the other observed variables in y t and z t are determined by all factors,
where the means μ nt andμ st , and probability π r,jt are functions of f t and where the variances σ 2 n andσ 2 s are treated as unknown coefficients. The number of firms at risk k r,jt is known since it is observed from the dataset. The factors in f m t capture shared business cycle dynamics in both macro and credit risk data, and are therefore common to x t , y t , andz t .
The frailty factors in f d t are region-specific; they only load on the realized defaults, y r,t , and the log-odds of EDFs,z s,t , from a given region. The frailty and industry factors are independent of observed macroeconomic and financial data. 
where θ r,jt may be interpreted as the log-odds or logit transform of π r,jt . This transform ensures that time-varying probabilities π r,jt are in the unit interval.
The panel data dynamics in (1) to (3) are captured by time-varying parameters or unobserved signals which are modeled as functions of the dynamic factors in f t . In particular,
we have
where λ r,j , c n , andc r,s are fixed effects, and risk factor sensitivities β, γ, and δ refer to the loadings on macro factors, frailty factors, and industry-specific factors, respectively. Fixed effects and factor loadings may differ across firms and regions. Since the cross-section is highdimensional, we follow in reducing the number of parameters by imposing the following additive structure, β, γ, δ,β,γ,δ (11) where χ 0 represents the baseline effect, χ 1,d is the industry-specific deviation, χ 2,s is the deviation related to rating group, and χ 3,r is the deviation related to regional effects. Since we assume that the baseline effect χ 0 is nonzero, some of the other coefficients need to be subject to zero constraints to ensure identification. The specification in (11) is parsimonious yet sufficiently flexible to accommodate heterogeneity across regions and industries.
The latent factors are stacked into the vector
. We assume that the elements of f t follow independent autoregressive dynamics. In our study, we have
where the coefficient matrix Φ and covariance matrix Σ η are assumed diagonal. Extensions to more complex dynamic structures are straightforward exercises. h , for h = 1, 2, . . .. As a result, the loading coefficients β r,j , γ r,j , and δ r,j in (9) can be interpreted as risk factor volatilities (standard deviations) for the firms in cross section (r, j). It also leads us to the initial condition f 1 ∼ N(0, Σ 0 ) and completes the specification of the factor process.
Parameter and risk factor estimation
The mixed measurement dynamic factor model presented in the previous section is an extension of the non-Gaussian measurement state space models as discussed in Shephard and Pitt (1997) and Durbin and Koopman (1997) to nonlinear models for partly non-Gaussian data. These methods are helpful regarding the feasibility of the analyses in our empirical study.
Thermometers and a forward looking indicator
Using the mixed measurement model set-up, we can construct indicators of financial distress for a specific region or combination of regions. Being based on (8) to (10), such indicators automatically integrate the effects of macro, frailty, and industry effects. We consider five indicators, four coincident measures ('thermometers'), and one forward-looking early warning indicator. Thermometers are designed to display the current 'heat' in the financial system.
Our early warning indicator captures imbalances that are currently building up and may pose a risk to the system at a later stage. Both thermometers and early warning indicators are essential tools to monitor system risk in a forward looking policy context.
The first thermometer is the model-implied financial sector failure rate. The time-varying default probability π r,jt in (7) can be interpreted as the fraction of financial intermediaries that are expected to fail over the next three months. We estimate this quantity by aggregating implied rates from the bottom up across banks and financial non-banks. Naturally, high failure rates imply high levels of common financial distress, and thus a higher risk of adverse real economy effects through financial failure.
A second thermometer is the time-varying probability of simultaneous failure of a large number of financial intermediaries, as suggested in Giesecke and Kim (2010) . Such intermediaries may be depository institutions, but also insurers, re-insurers, and broker/dealers that provide intermediation services. The latter three categories are part of the 'shadow' banking system. Due to the conditional independence assumption, the joint probability of failure can easily be constructed from the binomial cumulative distribution function and the time-varying financial sector failure rates.
A third indicator is based on the default signals θ r,jt in (9 
whereΦ ( A fourth indicator of financial system risk is the expected number of financial defaults over the next year conditional of at least one financial default occurring,
This Banking Stability Index has been proposed by Huang (1992) , and subsequently used by e.g. Hartmann et al. (2005) and Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) . Naturally, a high expected number of financial defaults indicates adverse financial conditions. Finally, the indicator (13) can be modified to only capture frailty and industry effects.
This yields a signal whether local default experience in a particular industry and region is unexpectedly different from what would be expected based on macro fundamentals f m t . This indicator is our 'credit risk deviations' early warning indicator, 
Data
We use data from three main sources in the empirical study below. First, a panel of macroeconomic and financial time series data is taken from Datastream with the aim to capture international business cycle and financial market conditions. Macroeconomic data is considered for the U.S. and Europe. number confirms the exclusion of these cases. We use the industry specification to distinguish between financial and non-financial firms. Table 2 provides an overview of the international exposure and default count data. Corporate data is most abundant for the U.S., with E.U. countries second. Most firms are either from the industrial or financial sector. The bottom of Table 2 suggests that about 60% of all worldwide ratings are investment grade. European and Asian firms are more likely to be rated investment grade, with shares of 83% and 75%, respectively. Figure 1 plots aggregate default counts, exposures, and observed fractions over time for each economic region. 
Figure 2: Expected default frequencies of 60 global financials
The top panel reports the standardized log-odds from EDF data for the largest 60 global financial firms (banks and financial non-banks). The sample consists of the largest 20 U.S., EU-27, and rest of the world financial firms, respectively. The raw data sample is from 1990Q1 to 2010Q4, and contains missing values. Missing values are inferred using the EM algorithm of Stock and Watson (2002) . The bottom graph plots the respective first principal components from the U.S. , EU-27, and the rest of the world sub-sample. is taken from Moody's KMV CreditEdge. These 3 × 20 = 60 expected default frequencies are based on a firm value model that takes equity values and balance sheet information as inputs. We use it to augment our relatively sparse data on actual defaults for financial firms. Figure 2 plots the panel of EDF data, after transformation to a quarterly scale and log-odds ratio. The principal components and reported eigenvalues in the bottom panel indicate substantial common variation across institutions and regions that can be summarized in a factor structure.
Empirical results on system risk
This section presents the main empirical findings. Section 5.1 comments briefly on the main sources of financial default clustering. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 present our thermometers and forward looking indicator for systemic risk assessment.
Why do financial defaults cluster?
Observed credit risk data reveals that aggregate financial sector failure rates are up to ten times higher in bad times than in good times. This is striking. Why do financial failures cluster so dramatically over time? Which sources of risk are important, and to what extent?
The answer to these questions is important for constructing effective coincident and forward looking risk indicators. Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for model specification (1) to (12). The fixed effects and factor loadings in the signal equation (9) satisfy the additive structure (11).
Coefficients λ in the left column combine to the baseline failure rates. The middle and righthand columns present estimates for loadings β, γ, and δ that pertain to macro, frailty, and industry factors, respectively.
The parameter estimates indicate that macro, frailty, and industry effects are all important for international credit risk conditions. Defaults from all regions and industries load significantly on common factors from global macro-financial data. This by itself already implies a considerable degree of default clustering. In general, however, common variation with macro data is not sufficient. Frailty effects are found to be important in all regions. The financial industry-specific factor loads significantly on data from all regions, which indicates pronounced shared dynamics across regions. Table 4 attributes the variation in the (Gaussian) log-odds of financial sector failure rates to three primary risk drivers, i.e., changes in macro-financial conditions, excess default clustering for all firms (financial and non-financial), and financial sector-specific dynamics.
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April 2011 We report the maximum likelihood estimates of selected coefficients in the specification of the log-odds ratio (9) with parameterization (11) for λ and β. Coefficients λ combine to fixed effects, or baseline failure rates. Factor loadings β, γ, and δ refer to macro, frailty, and industry risk factors, respectively. The estimation sample is from 1984Q1 to 2010Q4. We report the results of a variance decomposition of transformed (Gaussian, log-odds) failure rates for financial firms in three economic regions. The unconditional variance is attributed to three latent sources of financial distress. Each source of distress is captured by a corresponding set of latent factors and associated risk factor standard deviations. Specifically, s These drivers are associated with the vectors of latent factors f m t , f d t , and f i t , respectively. The relative importance of each source of variation can be inferred from the estimated risk factor loadings. Given that each risk factor is unconditional standard normal, the factor loading is the estimated risk factor volatility (standard deviation) by construction. Table 4 indicates that shocks to macroeconomic and financial conditions are an important source of financial distress. Historically, financial sector stress and business cycle downturns have tended to occur at roughly the same time. This is intuitive, since financial stress may have negative real consequences, and vice versa, with significant feedback and amplification effects. Timing effects are only captured indirectly in this decomposition, as current estimates of f m t capture a rotated version of current and lagged structural driving forces, see Stock and Watson (2002) for a discussion and intuition from the linear Gaussian context. Table 4 further suggests that financial industry specific dynamics are an important additional source of joint financial failure. As a result, financial sector risk dynamics can differ substantially from what is implied by shared exposure to observed macro-financial covariates. We conclude that all three sources of risk should all be accounted for.
Thermometers: coincident indicators of financial distress
This section presents the thermometers that are constructed from the estimated risk factors and loading parameters. Figure 3 plots a model-implied failure rate for a large cross section of E.U. and U.S. financial firms. The failure rate is the share of overall intermediaries that can be expected to fail over the next three months. The aggregate rates are obtained by aggregating from the bottom up across approximately 450 U.S. and 400 E.U. area financial firms, respectively. As a result, the reported failure rates take into account a significant part of the parallel banking system, i.e., insurers, real estate firms, and other rated nonbank financial firms that play a role in the intermediation process. This is partly due to their higher credit quality on average, see Table 2 .
Systemic risk is necessarily a multivariate concept, involving a system of banks and financial non-banks. The notion of systemic risk is now made operational as the risk of experiencing a simultaneous failure of a large number of financial institutions. Conceptually, simultaneous bank failures are analogous to disasters such as earthquakes and tsunamisunlikely events during most times, but with an asymmetrically large and potentially devastating impact if the risk materializes.
The top panels in Figure 4 plot the probability of at least k% of financial firms failing over a one year horizon (vertical axis), as a decreasing function of k, over time from 1984Q1
to 2010Q4 (horizontal axis). The left and right panels refer to the U.S. and E.U., respectively. The bottom panels cut the three-dimensional plots into various slices along the time dimension, at 0.1%, 0.5%, 1%, and 2% of overall financial sector firms. The figure reveals that, for example, in the E.U. area in 2010Q4, the probability of failure of at least 1% of financial sector firms (e.g., at least four firms of average size out of four hundred firms), at coincident levels of stress, is around 30%. This is a substantial risk of simultaneous failings. No data on financial sector counterparty exposures is used for this estimate. 
Early warning signals
We argue that large frailty effects at a given time can serve as a warning signal for a macroprudential policy maker. Roughly speaking, frailty effects capture the difference between current point-in-time default conditions vis-a-vis their benchmark values based on observable macro-financial covariates. Such differences can arise due to e.g. unobserved shifts in credit supply, changes in (soft) lending standards, and financial imbalances that are difficult to quantify. The main idea is that a comparison of credit and macro-financial conditions yields a useful early warning indicator for financial stability. It can be seen as related to the notion of tracking credit quantities over time, such as the private credit to GDP ratio, which is in line with the relevant early warning literature, see for example Lowe (2002), Misina and Tkacz (2008) , Borio and Drehmann (2009) , Alessi and Detken (2009), and Barrell, Davis, Karim, and Liadze (2010) . The main difference is that we suggest to compare credit risk instead of credit quantities to macro-financial conditions.
Past experiences of financial fragility, financial booms and financial crises, suggests that problems rarely appear at the same place in the financial system twice in a row. The main commonality between the different events that turned into a fully fledged financial crisis is that they were not expected by market participants and regulators. Goodhart and Persaud (2008) point out that if market prices for assets or credit were good at predicting crashes, crises would not happen. Similarly, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) beyond what is implied by observed macro-financial covariates and other information. We interpret the frailty factor as largely capturing unobserved variation in credit supply, or changes in the ease of credit access. We rely on two pieces of evidence for interpretation, as reported in Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab (2011) . First, frailty tends to load more heavily on financially weaker -and thus more credit constrained -firms. This appears to hold in general, and in particular during the years leading up to the financial crisis. Second, our frailty estimates are highly correlated with ex post reported lending standards, such as the ones obtained from the Senior Loan Officer Survey (SLO) and for example reported in Maddaloni and Peydro (2010) . These findings suggest that frailty, among other effects, captures outward shifts in (unobserved) credit supply. Changes in the ease of credit access surely affect credit risk conditions: it is hard to default if one is drowning in credit. As a result, systematic default risk ('the default cycle') can decouple from what is implied by macro-financial conditions ('the business cycle').
The left panel of Figure 7 presents the estimated frailty factors for the U.S., EU-27, and the rest of the world. For the U.S., frailty effects have been pronounced during bad times, The indicator captures the extent to which local stress in a given industry (the financial industry in this case) differs from that which macro-financial fundamentals would suggest.
The figure compares estimated deviations in U.S. , E.U. area, and respective rest of the world. Shaded areas correspond to U.S. NBER recession times. The graph is based on filtered risk factor estimates.
The indicator (15) is the absolute value of a standard normal covariate by construction. not take into account Euro Area sovereign default risk conditions, which are then captured by the latent industry factor.
We conclude that a monitoring of time-varying credit risk and macro-fundamental conditions is of key importance for making macro-prudential policy. Our mixed-measurement dynamic factor model is a versatile tool to make financial stability assessments operational.
Conclusion
We proposed a novel diagnostic framework for financial systemic risk assessment based on a mixed-measurement dynamic factor model. We combined the risk factor and parameter estimates into new and straightforward coincident and forward looking indicators of financial system risk. Conceptually, our factor structure allows us to address computational challenges associated with a large cross-sectional dimension of firms more easily than alternative frameworks for financial stability assessments. The new method easily allows one to combine different sets of panel data in a single integrated framework. In our empirical analysis, we found that a decoupling of credit risk from macro-financial fundamentals may serve as an early warning signal for a macro-prudential policy maker.
